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In 1995 a session at the American Historical Association conference brought together 
distinguished scholars to discuss the bases on which the major industrialized countries 
stabilized their political economies after 1945-47, a rather unexpected outcome in the face 
of the previous history of depression, acute social conflicts and war. The participants 
stressed the importance of the US foreign economic policy and − following the lines 
originally set by the work of Charles Maier − the critical role played by the 'politics of 
productivity', that is, the corporatist accommodation between labor and managers which 
linked economic growth, high employment and real wage increases to productivity.
1 
According to Maier, such a successful compact for growth in Western Europe and Japan 
was largely made possible by the division within the labor movement between 'moderate' 
and 'communist' leaders, with the resulting isolation of the latter in the major trade unions. 
Rather than a redistribution policy, the 'moderate' leaders pursued a strategy of compromise 
with management in which workers could gain from economic growth, real wage increases 
and welfare in exchange for participating in a strong productivity drive at firm-level.
2 
  Assessing the overall evidence from country studies, Charles Maier maintained that 
the United States, France, West Germany and Japan − despite their particular social and 
institutional conditions − offered 'a history of capitalist convergence' towards a corporatist 
settlement involving labor and management, which gave rise to a high level of economic 
growth and relative stability in industrialized countries during the post-war years. Then the 
author wonders about 'what degree Latin American societies could also be assimilated' to 
this overall corporatist model.
3  
  Perhaps surprisingly, Maier’s question is highly pertinent to the post-war history of 
Latin American countries, first because many of them underwent fast economic growth and 
rapid industrialization at the time. Even more important, however, the question may help to 
shed new light on the causes of the highly unstable social, political and institutional 
conditions in Latin America after World War II. Was this chronic instability determined 
only by the weakness of democratic institutions in Latin America? Or by an ingrained 
authoritarian and interventionist stance by Latin American elites? Even though one might 
be tempted to offer an affirmative answer to these questions, this conclusion should be 
placed in the context of the pre-war European background of far-reaching political 
instability, repression and destruction on a scale which had never been seen before. As 
Mark Mazower has remembered us, Europe was far from committed to democracy by the 
1940s and fascism was the most European ideology of those which marked the 'Dark 
Continent' in the twentieth century.
4 If this is true, what happened to large Latin American 
societies to prevent them overcoming their own dramatic past of authoritarianism, 
repression and inequality during the golden age of post-World War II economic growth? 
  This article advances the hypothesis that one crucial reason for the failure of 
democratic stabilization in post-war Brazil’s political economy lies in the relations between 
                                                 
1 See the articles presented in International Labor and Working-Class History, 50, Fall 1996, pp. 114-156. For Maier's 
original contribution, see C. Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic 
Policy After World War II', in C. Maier, In Search for Stability. Explorations in Historical Political Economy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
2 C. Maier, The Postwar Social Contract: Comment, International Labor and Working-Class History, 50, Fall 1996, p. 
148. 
3 Ibidem. 
4 M. Mazower, Dark Continent. Europe's Twentieth Century, London, Penguin, 1998.   3
the emerging trade union movement and employers. Brazil was the largest industrial 
economy in Latin America by the 1950s, and the article argues that labor politics in this 
country after World War II diverged sharply from the overall pattern observed in advanced 
industrial societies. Although left-wing trade union leaders took over the key positions in 
the Brazilian labor movement, demanding substantial improvements in workers’ social 
standing, they were not seen as reliable partners by industrialists and other elite groups in 
Brazil. As a result, industrial relations in Brazil became highly confrontational and 
antagonistic; undermining any prospects of a social contract which could favor sustained 
economic growth along with social reform. 
  The article is set mostly in Brazil's main industrial centre at the time − the state of 
São Paulo. São Paulo not only had the largest share of industrial output in Brazil (47.8 per 
cent in 1949 and 55.7 per cent in 1959, according to the Industrial Censuses), it was also 
home to the most active and influential employers' organorganization Federation of 
Industries of the State of São Paulo (Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo or 
FIESP), as well as trade unions. The analysis covers the main governments and phases of 
labor relations in Brazil from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Juscelino 
Kubitscheck government (January 1961). As there are no official statistics on 
manufacturing industry in 1960 and 1961, the article extends its quantitative data to 1962, 
which is used as a reference year for interpolation. Initially, the article briefly outline a 
theoretical model which help explain the operation of the social compact for growth, 
followed by an overview of how wages and productivity evolved in post-war Brazil, a step 
which is important to establish the main issues to be examined in the following sections. 
The separate parts of the main argument are presented in sequence, by looking at industrial 
relations in São Paulo and Brazil after 1945. The aim is to show which were the particular 
political solutions to the 'labor question' in the 1940s and the 1950s and the related 
outcomes in terms of wages and productivity. The article stresses the links between 
domestic politics and the international Cold War juncture, and attempts by international 
trade union organizations to support moderate trade union leaders who could establish a 
settlement with industrialists and governments in Brazil. At the end, the article summarizes 
the main arguments and speculates how historical developments in industrial relations had a 
wide-ranging impact on Brazilian economic and social post-war history. 
Wages and productivity in post-war Brazil 
  A key empirical evidence for the ‘social compact for growth’ hypothesis is that real 
wages grew in tandem with productivity in the crucial years of recovery and expansion of 
European and Japanese economies after 1945-47. By taking part in a productivity drive at 
firm level and limiting their wages demands to the growth of productivity, labor obtained 
steady increases in real wages and welfare which turned out to be the basis for a corporatist 
accommodation between labor and management. Indeed, manufacturing wages and 
productivity in the advanced industrial countries grew by 3 per cent p.a. between the mid-
1950s and mid-1960s. Fast growth, full employment, high productivity and rising wages 
were thus key features of the post-World War II settlement in European and Japanese 
economies  − until wages overcame productivity and inflationary pressures became 
widespread from the early 1970s.
5 
                                                 
5 P. Armstrong, A. Glyn & J. Harrison, Capitalism since 1945, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991, p. 120-1; B. Eichengreen, 
´Institutions and Economic Growth: Europe After World War II´, in N. Crafts and G. Toniolo (eds), Economic Growth   4
  The situation is shown in Figure 1.
6 In an imperfectly competitive labor market, the 
real wage bargained by unions (w
B) depends upon the bargained nominal wage (W), which 
takes into account the expectations about the price level which will prevail over the period 
of the wage contract. Both the nominal wage and the real wage bargained by unions depend 
upon the state of the labor market, given by the unemployment level (U), which in turn 
affects the bargaining power of workers. It is assumed that there is a stable relation between 
the bargained real wage and the unemployment level, namely, the bargained real wage 
(BRW) curve: 
) (U b w
B = , with  0 ) ( < ′ U b ,         ( 1 )  
in which E LF U − ≡ , where LF  is the labor force and  E the employment level. 
  The observed (actual) real wage depends not only on the bargaining process 
between trade unions and employers, but also on the general price index (P), which results 
from the price decisions by firms. The price-determined real wage (w
P) is, therefore, the 




P = .             ( 2 )  
  Taking the hypothesis of normal cost pricing, the price level is defined as a multiple 









= ,          ( 3 )  
where LP is the labor productivity (output per worker) at normal capacity level and m is 
the the part of the output per head taken by firms as profits. Introducing (3) in (2) the price-
determined real wage (PRW) curve is defined as follows: 
) 1 ( m LP w
P − = .          ( 4 )  
  Based on an stylized fact that in imperfectly competitive product markets the prices 
do not respond much to changes in demand, it is reasonable to suppose that both mark-up 
and labor productivity are constant, i.e., the PRW curve is flat.  
The intersection between the bargained real wage curve and the price-determined 
real wage curve defines the equilibrium level of employment (En) or, still, the equilibrium 
rate of unemployment (Un). At this level of employment, workers and firm’s claims over 
the product per head are both satisfied and consistent. The condition of consistency 




mLP LP + =   .          ( 5 )  
                                                                                                                                                     
in Europe Since 1945, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
6 The following model was elaborated by W. Carlin & D. Soskice, Macroeconomics and the Wage Bargain. A Modern 
Approach to Employment, Inflation and the Exchange Rate, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990. 





= , where y is the output and  E y LP / ≡ . 
8 The following equation was obtained by simple algebraic handling of the equation (1). 
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That is, the real profits per worker (mLP ) aimed at by firms and the real wages per 
worker (W/P) resulting from wage bargaining and price-setting must be compatible with the 






















Figure 1 - Accommodating wage and productivity growth 
   If unemployment falls, there will be an increase in the bargained real wage due to 
the higher bargaining power of workers, i.e., BRW will be greater than PRW. As unions 
take advantage of this situation and are able to bring nominal wages in line with the 
bargained real wage, the shares in the product per head claimed by firms and workers will 
be inconsistent, as real wages will rise and profits will fall. Assuming that firms want to 
keep their profit margin stable, they will push prices up in order to restore their mark-up to 
the former level. The targeted increase in real wages pursued by unions will not take place 
and the final outcome will be only accelerating inflation. 
  Unions however may successfully push their demand for higher real wages if labor 
productivity is improved. In such a case,  LP  goes up and allows for a higher PRW in 
Figure 1, at a lower equilibrium rate of unemployment, U1 for example. The condition is 
that nominal wages rise at the same rate as productivity, so that workers’ and firms’ claims 
over the output per head can be accommodated without generating inflationary pressure. 
This is apparently what happened to the European economies in the early post-war years, 
and set the basis for a ‘social compact for growth’, as mentioned above.  
  Wages and productivity evolved differently in post-war Brazil. Data on these 
variables are limited and somewhat tenuous. In the next section, Tables 1 and 2 show an 
attempt to construct wage and labor productivity series by using interpolated and backward 
extrapolated estimates from official statistics. A summary of the methodological procedures 
is presented in the appendix. In order to make clear the limitation of the series, data 



















mLP    6
  Overall trends of the data can be visualized before a more detailed analysis in the 
next sections. Thus Figure 2 shows that, for most of the 1945-1962 period, labor 
productivity exceeded real wages in Brazil’s manufacturing industry, in particular from 
1955. Tests of structural stability by using a regression model with dummy variables show 
that there was a change in the level and the slope of Brazil’s labor productivity series, 
indicating the existence of a structural break in 1955 − an outcome not replicated by 
wages.
9 Such a result is revealing since the 1950s were a period of remarkable economic 
growth in Brazil − [quote Brazil’s compound rate of growth based on oxlad]. The economic 
causes of such a negative performance of manufacturing wages still remain to be 
investigated and are beyond the scope of the present article. An effect, however, can be 
deducted from the previous analysis: given the boost in productivity and the relatively slow 
growth of wages after 1955, firms experimented an increase in their profits at the expense 















  Figure 2 - Wages and labor productivity in Brazil, 1945-1962    
  A similar trend is observed regarding the largest industrial centre in Brazil, the state 
of São Paulo (Figure 3), which will be the main focus of analysis in the following sections. 
Real wages lagged behind labor productivity from 1956, an outcome that in São Paulo was 
even more striking than in Brazil as a whole in the end of the period examined. Like in the 
case of Brazil, a regression model with both intercept and slope dummy variables show that 
São Paulo’s labor productivity series is not stable across time, indicating the presence of a 
structural break in 1956 (see the appendix). It seems that, even at the heart of the industrial 
transformation in Brazil, workers were not able to keep pace with rationalization and 
improvements in production organization by firms, which led to significant increases in 
labor productivity during the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s.   
                                                 















  Figure 3 - Wages and labor productivity in São Paulo, 1945-1962   
  Demographic conditions, inflation and labor market structure are some likely 
candidates for an economic explanation of the sluggish performance of industrial wages in 
the booming post-war Brazilian economy. The following sections, however, will deal with 
a different issue, related to labor politics, wages and productivity: why did Brazil’s political 
economy fail to give birth to a social compact which could help design proper economic 
and social policies in order to promote growth along with increasing welfare? In particular, 
it will be examined the relations between employers and workers that may have prevented 
industrial wages from catching up with productivity in an otherwise favorable economic 
situation, marked by high economic growth and employment. 
Labor politics in the early post-war years 
  By early 1945, Brazil was experiencing all the uncertainties and social tensions of a 
world which had gone through years of war, material destruction, genocide and social 
disruption. Although the country had not been scenario of fights during the Second World 
War, public opinion closely followed the events, mobilized to take part in the conflict and 
helped force a government sympathetic to the Axis to send the army to Europe to join the 
Allies. The institutional and political situation, therefore, was awkward. On the one hand, 
the defeat of fascist regimes in Europe fuelled the expectations of a new era of democracy, 
popular participation, social justice and economic development. On the other hand, the 
country was still under the rule of the Estado Novo dictatorship, a product of a coup d’etat 
led by Getúlio Vargas and a coalition of conservative forces in 1937. The overthrow of 
Vargas and the end of Estado Novo in October 1945 did not solve the impasse, since a 
coalition of conservative forces led by Eurico Dutra, a former Ministry of War during the 
Estado Novo regime, ended up winning the presidential elections in December 1945. Thus, 
the restoration of institutional legality headed by conservative groups closely linked to the 
early dictatorship only reasserted the uncertainties and social tensions in Brazilian society. 
In particular, this situation raised serious doubts about the ability of new political and social 
groups to replace the authoritarian elites which traditionally held power in Brazil. With   8
regards the outcomes, there was skepticism whether the benefits of economic development 
could be extended beyond the powerful landed and entrepreneurial classes.
10 
  The particular political and social alignments established in the immediate post-war 
years, characterized by continuity with the authoritarian past, deeply marked labor relations 
in Brazil in the decades to come. Labor issues continued to be regulated by the highly 
centralized and interventionist system of industrial relations inherited from the Estado Novo 
regime, which formally deprived trade unions of autonomy and independence from the 
state. Nonetheless, labor politics in post-war Brazil shows a complex history of working 
class organization and conflicts which went far beyond the corporatist system of industrial 
relations. A major example of this were the workers’ initiatives and organization on the 
shop floor, which contrary to what is asserted by a still influential view of Brazilian labor 
history, seem that not only ran a great deal parallel with the trade unions but even clashed 
with the latter in some important historical junctures. The result was that relations between 
industrialists, workers and governments were characterized by conflict, instability and 
repression. The emergence of a confrontational pattern of industrial relations in post-war 
Brazil can be illustrated by the overwhelming intervention by governments and 
industrialists in both trade union matters and on the shop floor.
11 
  A repressive stance by governments and industrialists was manifested already in the 
first months of the new government elected in December 1945. Early in this year, there had 
been strikes in hundreds of factories in São Paulo which were led by workers apparently 
without links with the official trade unions. This first wave of strikes was followed by new 
demonstrations and industrial actions in the following months. It seems that the strikes and 
the assertive stance by the rank-and-file caused a deep impression upon the newly-elected 
Dutra government (January 1946 - January 1951) and the industrialists. By the end of 1945, 
Paulista industrialists were already denouncing what they saw as the importation of exotic 
redistributive ideologies, which were being put into practice by social democratic parties in 
Europe (particularly in the United Kingdom, according to the industrialists) in the wake of 
wartime destruction. In Brazil, FIESP pointed out that it seemed that ‘the workers want[ed] 
[...] to replace management, and divide what appears to them superfluous. This is the social 
justice preached by their attitudes. The madness is so great that it causes dismay to 
comment.’
12 Alarmed by labor demands, in early 1946 the industrialists hailed a strike law 
passed by the Dutra government, which in practice imposed a ban on industrial action. 
According to FIESP, labor attitudes at the time were a call for the ‘violent dissolution of 
our traditional political and social institutions, which make up our secular style of political 
organization.’
13 
                                                 
10 R. Maranhão, Sindicato e Democratização: Brasil, 1945-1950, São Paulo, Brasiliense, 1979; L. Bethell, ‘Brazil’, in 
Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948, eds L. Bethell & I. Roxborough, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
11 J. French, The Brazilian Workers’ ABC: Class Conflict and Alliances in Modern São Paulo, Chapel Hill, University of 
North Carolina Press, 1992; J. Wolfe, Working Women, Working Men. São Paulo and the Rise of Brazil’s Working 
Class, 1900-1955, 1900-1955, Durham, Duke University Press, 1993; R. Colistete, Labour Relations and Industrial 
Performance in Brazil: Greater São Paulo, 1945-1960, Houndmills, Palgrave, 2001. 
12 Revista Industrial de São Paulo [hereafter RISP], no. 13 (1945), p. 64. 
13 RISP, no. 15 (1946), p. 21. For the anti-strike legislation: Decree no. 9,070, 15/3/1946, Revista do Trabalho (May-June 
1947).   9
  The Dutra government was from the outset committed to the industrialists and soon 
showed its willingness to curb the emerging labor movement. In addition to the strike law 
of March 1946, the government decreed a ban on political meetings and demonstrations in 
cities (including São Paulo) affected by strikes in February 1946, held back long-overdue 
trade union elections, imprisoned trade unionists accused of being leftists, and stormed 
newly-founded organizations backed by the communists (such as the United Movement of 
Workers or MUT).
14 The final crackdown, however, was still being prepared. In September 
1946, a FIESP director, Morvan Dias Figueiredo, was appointed to the Ministry of Labor, 
Industry and Commerce and signaled that he was only waiting for the state elections to 
act.
15  Meanwhile, there were informed reports that the inner circles of the Dutra 
government had long been preparing to outlaw the Communist Party as a legal 
organization.
16 
  Eighteen months of hesitation came to an end on 7 May 1947, when the Federal 
Justice outlawed the Communist Party. This decision was likely to have been influenced by 
the Cold War confrontation, sparked off by President Truman’s speech in the US Congress 
in March 1947. A British diplomat even pointed out that the new Truman Doctrine had 
been seen in Brazil as a ‘green light to anti-communist measures.’
17 The Cold War also 
reasserted a deep-rooted mistrust among industrialists and other conservative sectors (such 
as the military and the Catholic Church) of open labor politics in Brazil. Along with the ban 
on the Communist Party, an additional decree set out intervention in all trade union 
organizations allegedly under the influence of the communists. As the British Labor 
Attaché noted at the time, ‘[o]pen intervention on this scale [...] seems quite unprecedented 
even under the Dictatorship’.
18 Truly, the catch-all repression affected all labor groups 
which had not been closely linked with the Estado Novo and the Ministry of Labor. 
  Repression also reached the workplace. The changing political situation apparently 
stimulated firms which resisted negotiating wage increases directly with workers to embark 
on a series of repressive measures on the shop floor. For example, the largest metalworking 
companies in the state of São Paulo confronted walkouts since February 1946 and took 
advantage of the strike law decreed by Dutra to have more freedom to fire workers on 
strike. By the end of March only in two industrial cities of Greater São Paulo, Santo André 
and São Bernardo do Campo, were there about 1400 workers dismissed by metalworking 
companies. Firms also blacklisted workers who had taken the lead in the walkouts and been 
fired so that they could not be able to find other jobs.
19 At the same time, the industrial 
companies sought to assert authority in the workplace by bringing in the police. In certain 
                                                 
14 Public Records Office [hereafter PRO] Foreign Office [hereafter FO] 371/61204, Annual Report on Brazil - 1946, 
13/1/1947, by D. Gainer, p. 11; E. Rowell, Monthly Labor Review (April 1 to May 1, 1946), Record Group (hereafter 
RG) 84, 850.4, National Archives Building, College Park, MD (hereafter NACP), pp. 16-17; E. Rowell, Monthly Labor 
Review (May 1 to June 1, 1946), RG 84, 850.4, NACP, p. 8. 
15 PRO FO 371/61204, Trade Union Developments in Brazil, 9/1/1947, by C. German, p. 2. 
16 Since March 1946 at least, the US government had been informed about plans to ban the Communist Party. See e.g. E. 
Hoover to F. Lyon, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 8/3/1946, RG 59, 832.00B/3-846, NACP.   
17 PRO FO 371/61204, Outlawing of the Communist Party in Brazil, 4/5/1947, by G. Young, p. 2. For the Truman 
Doctrine, see e.g. W. LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996, 8th edn, New York, McGraw-Hill, 
1997, pp. 49-58. 
18 Decree no. 23,046, 7/5/1947. PRO FO 371/61205, Labour Report no. 23, 18/6/1947, by C. German, p. 3. 
19 Hoje, 8/3/1946, p. 7; 20/3/1946, p. 8.   10
cases, management infiltrated policemen to identify and help to dismiss strike leaders. In 
others, the police was called in to quell meetings and to dissuade workers to not take their 
demands to management.
20 
  By August 1947, well-informed sources reported that more than 170 trade unions all 
over Brazil had fallen under the government’s new law, with their officials being replaced 
by appointees of the Ministry of Labor.
21 In São Paulo, trade unions involved in labor 
demands during the previous months had their officials ousted, leftist affiliates expelled, 
and their operations closely watched by the Ministry of Labor and the political police 
(Department for Political and Social Order or DOPS). At the same time, non-official 
organizations set up after 1945 were persecuted and declared illegal. The most noticeable 
case was the Confederation of Brazilian Workers (CTB), established by over 1,500 
delegates at a national congress in Rio de Janeiro in September 1946. The CTB was 
endorsed by about 800 trade unions and arose as the most representative nation-wide labor 
organization during the immediate post-World War II period.
22 Even so, the May 1946 
Decree explicitly mentioned the CTB as provoking ‘interference with output, order and 
discipline’ and decreed that all trade unions affiliated or contributing to it would be subject 
to intervention.
23 
  The CTB was also important because its creation represented a fundamental schism 
in the trade union movement which would characterize labor politics in Brazil throughout 
the 1950s. Indeed, the national congress which set up the CTB had originally been a result 
of a compromise between left-wing and independent trade unionists, on the one hand, and 
those directly sponsored by the Ministry of Labor, on the other. During the congress, 
however, the group close to the government walked out when confronted by an 
overwhelming majority of independent and left-wing delegates.
24 As a response to the 
CTB, the Ministry of Labor first announced the creation of a new organization, the National 
Confederation of Labor (or CNT). Confronted with legal difficulties and negative reactions 
in Congress, however, the Dutra government decided to recognize a national confederation 
already stipulated by the CLT. Thus, on 28 October 1946 President Dutra signed Decree 
Law 21,798 establishing the National Confederation of Industrial Workers (Confederação 
Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Indústria or CNTI).
25 During its short existence, the CTB 
became by far the most influential organization among trade unions in São Paulo and Brazil 
as a whole. The CNTI was officially established by the Ministry of Labor only in June 
1947, just after the ban on the CTB.
26 
                                                 
20 Hoje, 4/6/1946, p. 5. 
21 This number implied that, of the estimated 460,000 workers affiliated to trade unions in Brazil, about 300,000 had been 
affected by the interventions. See PRO FO 371/61205, Labour Report no. 26, 16/8/1947, by C. German, p. 3.  
22 J. Henry, ‘Developments in Brazilian Labor Organization Since VJ-Day’, Monthly Labor Review (March 1947), p. 440. 
23 PRO FO 371/61205, Labour Report no. 23, 18/6/1947, by C. German, appendix 1, p. 2.  
24 Henry, ‘Developments in Brazilian Labor’, pp. 439-440; E. Rowell, Monthly Labor Review (August 1 to September 1, 
1946), RG 84, 850.4, NACP, p. 6; E. Rowell, Monthly Labor Review (September 1 to October 1, 1946), 16/12/1946, 
RG 84, 850.4, NACP, pp. 3-4. For ‘independent trade unionists’ we mean the trade union leaders who did not follow 
the Ministry of Labour’s orientation in labour issues 
25 E. Rowell, Monthly Labor Review (October 1 to November 1, 1946), RG 84, 850.4, NACP, p. 10. 
26 Henry, ‘Developments in Brazilian Labor’, p. 440; PRO Ministry of Labour and National Service [hereafter LAB] 
13/498, Labour Report no. 15, 3/1/1947, by C. German, pp. 1-2; PRO FO 371/61205, Labour Report no. 24, 26/6/1947, 
by C. German.   11
  The major reason for the split in the labor movement was that the CTB retained the 
allegiance of independents and left-wingers, who had progressively taken the lead in the 
major trade unions since 1945. While there is no firm evidence as to the extent of 
communist influence as yet, one source estimated that 9 out of the 15 officials of the 
provisional executive committee chosen in the CTB congress were linked to the 
Communist Party.
27 Following this trend, the first elected general secretary of CTB was 
Roberto Morena, the most important communist trade unionist in Brazil during the post-
war period. It can be said, therefore, that the split in Brazil’s organised labor anticipated the 
schism in the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in 1949, which would lead to the 
formation of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and of two 
opposed, antagonistic international labor organizations in the divided world of the Cold 
War. Unlike what happened in European countries, however, the split did not provoke a 
division of the left nor the isolation of the communists in the Brazilian labor movement.
28 
The full implications of this fact would become clearer only in the years to come. 
  A chief aim of Dutra government’s labor policy was to establish a new cadre of 
trusted officials which could speak to the government and industrialists. The key figure in 
this policy was Morvan Dias Figueiredo, the FIESP’s representative in charge of the 
Ministry of Labor. As long as the repression hit all active trade unions in Brazil from 1947, 
Figueiredo sought to replace many officials with hard-core ministerialistas who had been 
identified with the Estado Novo apparatus. In fact, the aim of finding faithful labor leaders 
was already being pursued by Paulista industrialist leaders for some time. For example, 
during the strikes of 1946 FIESP only accepted to negotiate with workers associated to the 
Estado Novo structure. The evidence suggests, however, that industrialists and the 
government were not successful in consolidating a reliable labor leadership. Early in 1948, 
Morvan Figueiredo had already recognized that appointed trade unionists had very little 
support among the rank and file and were not a viable alternative to the left and 
independents.
29 The only alternative at the time, Figueiredo implied, was to suspend all free 
elections for trade unions and stick to a hard-line policy on labor. 
  Still, not only of repression was made the history of labor relations in Brazil 
between 1945 and 1950.
30 The data and estimates on wages and labor productivity in 
Tables 1 and 2 help to uncover other trends in Brazilian and Paulista industry at the time. 
The tables also show the evolution of the unit labor costs W/LP, i.e., the wage costs per unit 
output. Initially, average real wages in both Brazil’s and the state of São Paulo’s 
manufacturing industry fell sharply in 1947: - 11.9 per cent and - 11.1 per cent, 
respectively. It seems therefore that Dutra’s economic and wage policy caused a major 
adjustment in labor markets from the end of 1946, with a significant impact on real wages. 
                                                 
27 E. Rowell, Brazilian Labor Congress, 9/12/1946, RG 59, 832.504/12-946, NACP, enclosure. Rowell also mentioned 
estimations of the actual number of communist delegates in the CTB Congress: 200 out of 1,500. See E. Rowell, 
Monthly Labor Review (September 1 to October 1, 1946), RG 84, 850.4, NACP, p. 3. 
28 On WFTU split and ICFTU composition, A. Carew, ‘The Schism Within the World Federation of Trade Unions, 
Government and Trade Union Diplomacy’, International Review of Social History, 24 (1984), pp. 297-335 and 
‘Conflict Within the ICFTU: Anti-Communism and Anti-Colonialism in the 1950s’, International Review of Social 
History, 41 (1996), pp. 147-181.  
29 PRO FO 371/68167, Labour Report no. 37, 26/1/1948, by C. German, p. 2. 
30 Quantitative and qualitative data on welfare and detailed description of measures aimed to elicit workers’ effort are 
provided in Colistete, Labour relations and industrial performance in Brazil..   12
Dutra’s policies had lasting effects at the national level, as real wages in Brazil’s 
manufacturing industry only recovered from 1950, after erratic behavior in 1948 and 1949 
(Table 1, column 1).  
Table 1 - Wages and productivity in manufacturing industry, Brazil, 1945-1962 
(1952=100) 




Unit labor costs 
(W/LP) 
(3) 
1945 83  [76]  [1.10] 
1946 94  [75]  [1.25] 
1947 84  [86]  [0.98] 
1948 87  [87]  [0.99] 
1949 79  94  0.84 
1950  [86] [96] [0.89] 
1951  [93] [98] [0.95] 
1952 100  100  1.00 
1953 93  102  0.91 
1954 104  104  1.00 
1955 106  111  0.95 
1956 113  122  0.93 
1957 114  130  0.88 
1958 118  150  0.78 
1959 115  157  0.73 
1960 [118] [162] [0.73] 
1961 [121] [166] [0.72] 
1962 123  171  0.72 
Sources: see appendix. 
  In São Paulo, however, existing data show that there was a significant push in 
industrial wages during the remaining years of the Dutra government: an annual compound 
rate of growth of 8.8 per cent in São Paulo against 0.8 per cent in Brazil, between 1947 and 
1950 (as calculated from Table 2, column 1).
31 At least with regard to the state of São 
Paulo, such an outcome suggests that alongside the hard-line labor policy of both 
government and companies, there were wage increases above the current levels of inflation 
between 1947 and 1950. This result is particularly relevant given that there was no 
modification in minimum-wage levels during these years. A possible reason for such 
increasing wages is the existence of a ‘social subsistence wage’. Another possibility is that 
specific labor policies implemented by firms and growing pressures by shop-floor 
organizations, fuelled by expanding industrial output from 1948, pushed up real wages 
despite widespread repression at trade union level. Both hypotheses, however, still have to 
be tested.
 32   
                                                 
31 The formula for calculating the annual compound rate of growth is shown in the appendix. Hereafter, all rates of growth 
will be calculated according to this formula, from the indexes presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
32 J. Wells, ‘Industrial Accumulation and Living Standards in the Long-Run: The São Paulo Industrial Working Class, 
1930-1975, Part II’, The Journal of Development Studies, 19 (1983), p. 301; Colistete, Labour relations and industrial 
performance in Brazil, chapter 2.   13
Table 2 - Wages and productivity in manufacturing industry, São Paulo, 1945-1962 
(1952=100) 




Unit labor costs 
(W/LP) 
(3) 
1945 82  [87]  [0.94] 
1946 90  [81]  [1.11] 
1947 80  [95]  [0.85] 
1948 82  [95]  [0.87] 
1949  95 97 0.98 
1950 103  94  1.09 
1951 [101] [97]  [1.04] 
1952 100  100  1.00 
1953 98  102  0.96 
1954 108  105  1.03 
1955 108  109  0.99 
1956 115  119  0.97 
1957 116  130  0.90 
1958 121  147  0.82 
1959 109  158  0.69 
1960 [110] [161] [0.68] 
1961 [111] [164] [0.68] 
1962 112  167  0.67 
Sources: see appendix. 
  Less ambiguous were the results of productivity. The indexes in Table 1 and 2 
suggest that labor productivity lagged behind wages levels in 1945 (Brazil) and 1946 
(Brazil and São Paulo), what may help explain industrialist opposition to workers’ demands 
in such years and the use of repression in an attempt to discipline labor markets. Anyhow, 
there was a recovery of labor productivity in the following years. In Brazil, the unit labor 
costs fell from 1.10 in 1945 to 0.84 and 0.89 in 1949 and 1950, respectively. As for São 
Paulo, the same index dropped from 1.11 in 1946 to 0.85 in 1947, though it was followed 
by an increase to 0.98 and 1.09 in 1949 and 1950, respectively. In both cases, what these 
estimates indicate is that firms took advantage of Dutra’s labor policies to rationalize their 
production processes and increase the extraction of workers’ effort. In São Paulo, such 
policies appear to have even allowed firms to partially accommodate workers’ demands in 
the form of higher real wages. Partial accommodation of labor’s claims, however, took 
place amidst a political and institutional situation wholly adverse for workers’ organization. 
A confrontational pattern of labor relations was already set to become a feature in Brazil’s 
political economy by the end of the 1940s. 
The recovery of trade unions 
  Trade unions experimented a slow recovery from the setbacks during the Dutra 
government. Although Getúlio Vargas had been elected in the end of 1950 in the wake of a 
broad appeal to labor, during the first year his government took a careful line regarding the 
trade unions under intervention. Only on 1 May 1951, the Minister of Labor, Danton 
Coelho, officially announced his intention of holding free elections for trade union offices 
during the following months. In particular, Coelho promised to abolish the ‘ideology   14
certificate’ (certificado de ideologia), a personal document issued by the DOPS and aimed 
to identify left-wing candidates and prevent them from running for trade union office. 
Despite the announced liberalizing measures, the certificado de ideologia was officially 
revoked only in September 1952; in the meantime, the convocation of trade union elections 
went ahead slowly throughout 1951 and 1952.
33 Together with a cautious approach to 
organized labor, the Ministry of Labor launched an affiliation campaign for new members 
of trade unions in order to strengthen the position of pro-government trade unionists in the 
labor movement. The aim was clearly to confront the expected growth in the number of 
leftists and independents in the forthcoming trade union elections.
34  
  The replacement of Danton Coelho by Segadas Viana at the Ministry of Labor in 
September 1951 reinforced the government’s ambiguous attitude towards organized labor − 
an attitude which combined speeches on syndical freedom and frequent interventions in 
trade union issues.
35 It was only with the appointment of João Goulart to the Ministry of 
Labor in June 1953 that an aggressive labor policy was implemented by the Vargas 
government. The new Minister was at the head of a large section of trabahista (from the 
Brazilian Labor Party or PTB) trade unionists and sought to establish his group as a 
powerful force in the Brazilian labor movement. Goulart’s strategy was to build up a 
working relationship with the communists and other left-wingers while at the same time 
presenting himself as an alternative to the left.
36 Although Goulart would be removed from 
the Ministry of Labor during a serious political crisis in March 1954, he retained a strong 
influence over trabalhista labor leaders and the government bureaucracy during the 
remainder of the Vargas administration and beyond. Goulart’s influence over labor was a 
major asset in his successful bid for the Vice-Presidency between 1956 and 1961.
37   
  The result of the gradual slackening of the government’s grip on trade unions, more 
clearly after late 1951, was a resurgence of organized labor in the Brazilian political scene. 
In São Paulo, the main expression of this was the setting up of the Inter-Syndical Unity 
Pact (Pacto de Unidade Inter-Sindical or PUI) by the largest and more militant trade unions 
in the state. The Unity Pact was a result of a huge industrial action which brought Greater 
São Paulo to a standstill during March and April 1953. In the following years, the PUI 
turned out to be the most representative and influential labor organization in São Paulo, 
despite of the fact that it was never granted official recognition by successive governments. 
As with the CTB in 1946-47, the Unity Pact formed a broad coalition of independents and 
left-wing activists who held key positions in Paulista trade unions.
38 
  Still, the realization of trade union elections, and the creation of strong parallel 
organizations such as the PUI, did not put an end to the threats looming over the newly 
                                                 
33 PRO FO 371/103253, Labour Report no. 69, 25/2/1953, by L. Mitchell, p. 7; H. Hammond, Quarterly Labor Report - 
Third Quarter 1951, 17/10/1951, RG 59, 832.06/10-1751, NACP, p. 14. 
34 H. Hammond, Minister of Labor’s Report on Status of Syndicates, 2/3/1951, RG 59, 832.062/3-251, NACP, p. 2. 
35 E.g., PRO FO 371/103253, Labour Report no. 75, 29/10/1953, by L. Mitchell, p. 11. 
36 I. Salert, Labor Report - Second Quarter 1953, 20/8/1953, RG 59, 832.06/8-2053, NACP; I. Salert, Labor Report - 
Third Quarter 1953, 18/11/1953, RG 59, 832.06/11-1853, NACP, pp. 2-5; I. Salert, Labor - Last Quarter, 1953, 
4/2/1954, RG 59, 832.06/2-454, NACP, pp. 1-2.  
37 On the removal of Goulart, PRO LAB 13/503, Labour Report no. 79, 9/3/1954, by L. Mitchell. For Goulart’s influence 
over labour, J. Fishburn, Annual Labor Report for 1958, 12/3/1959, RG 59, 832.06/3-1259, NACP, pp. 1-3. 
38  E.g., Notícias de Hoje [hereafter NH], 9/5/1954, front page and p. 6; 15/5/1954, pp. 6 and 8; 2/9/1954, p. 2.   15
reorganized labor movement. In particular, following Vargas’s suicide in 1954, the short 
Café Filho government (August 1954-November 1955) took an uncompromising attitude 
towards organized labor by interfering in trade union issues. The Minister of Labor, 
Napoleão Guimarães, barred elected trade unionists accused of being leftists from taking 
office (for example, at the São Paulo Trade Union of Textile Workers); acted to quell 
industrial actions (for example, in the tramway industry in Rio de Janeiro); and enacted a 
decree banning all inter-union committees (including the PUI) set up by organized labor in 
the previous months in Brazil.
39 Only with the end of the Café Filho tenure, and the 
appointment of Nelson Omegna as Minister of Labor, could the trade union movement 
work again without systematic intervention by the government. 
  Under the Juscelino Kubitscheck government (January 1956 - January 1961)  there 
was a substantial growth of trade union activities and their influence in Brazilian society. 
Overall, the Ministry of Labor refrained from exercising a tight control over trade union 
issues, and sought to bolster the moderate and trabalhista wing of the labor movement − 
against the leftists and independents who were at the head of the most powerful official 
trade unions and parallel organizations. In São Paulo, this policy allowed for a substantial 
expansion of the Inter-Syndical Unity Pact, which by mid-1957 claimed to have about 104 
affiliated trade union organizations − including the largest ones in the state of São Paulo.
40 
In addition to dealing with traditional labor issues, the PUI and individual trade unions 
embarked on campaigns for the revision of minimum wage levels, social security reform, 
and even on macroeconomic issues such as inflation and industrial policy.
41 In the late 
1950s, the PUI was replaced by the Trade Union Council (Conselho Sindical dos 
Trabalhadores or CST) as the major inter-union organization in the state of São Paulo. 
Launched in September 1959, the CST was apparently an attempt by trabalhistas and 
janistas (linked to Jânio Quadros, Governor of São Paulo and elected President in 1960) to 
regain the initiative in the labor movement in São Paulo. However, the left and 
independents decided to participate in the venture and soon took over the major positions in 
the new trade union organization.
42   
  The 1956-1961 years were also important for the increasing ideological disputes in 
the labor movement. On the domestic scene, the hard-line trade unionists (ministerialistas) 
traditionally close to government remained in control of state federations and national 
confederations − such as the CNTI. The influence of this group over the rank and file and 
intermediate labor leaders was small, so that its major activity was restricted to high-level 
articulation and contacts (with government officers, US embassy, and ICFTU) aiming to 
                                                 
39 I. Salert, Visit to Labor, Industry and Commerce Minister Alencastro Guimarães, 21/9/1954, RG 59, 832.06/9-2154, 
NACP; I. Salert, Quarterly Labor Review - Third Quarter 1954, 8/10/1954, RG 59, NACP;  PRO LAB 13/503, Labour 
Report no. 81, 14/10/1954, by L. Mitchell, pp. 1-2. 
40 NH, 1/5/1957, p. 2. 
41 B. Sowel, Official Report on Labor, Year 1958, 16/3/1959, RG 59, 839.06/3-1659, NACP, pp. 2-3; PRO LAB 13/1339, 
Labour Report no. 16/59, 10/6/1959, by R. Morris. 
42 PRO LAB 13/1339, Labour Report no. 33/59, 10/10/1959, by R. Morris, p. 1; PRO LAB 13/1339, Labour Report no. 
40/59, 12/11/1959, by R. Morris, pp. 1-2; J. Fishburn, Brazilian Labor 1959, 7/12/1959, RG 59 832.06/12-759, NACP, 
pp. 6-7; W. Cochran, City of São Paulo Trade Union Convention, 18/4/1960, RG 59, 832.062/4-1860, NACP; R. 
Burton, Goulart Appears to Have Headed Off Split in São Paulo Labor Movement, 31/8/1960, RG 59, 832.062/8-3160, 
NACP. For a strong criticism, by a left-wing group, of the dissolution of the PUI and participation in the CST, see Ação 
Socialista, Oct. 1959, p. 3. The group was the Liga Socialista Independente.   16
contain the growth of the left in the Brazilian labor movement.
43 On the other hand, there 
was fierce competition among trabalhista, independent, left-wing and other groups for 
hegemony in the trade unions. In São Paulo, significant examples of this were, first, the 
formation of the Trade Union Renewal Movement (Movimento Renovador Sindical) from a 
split in the Communist Party in 1957; second, the growth of the Catholic militancy and, 
third, the emergence of groups associated to Jânio Quadros and João Goulart.
44 
Notwithstanding increasing disputes, the Communist Party remained the single most 
powerful political force in the labor movement in São Paulo and Brazil during the second 
half of the 1950s. It was made clear in regional and national trade union conferences in 
1960, when the communists were able to decisively influence the sorts of issues discussed 
and the resolutions adopted.
45 Likewise, in 1958 the US Labor Attaché deemed that the 
communists had significant influence or control over one-third of the 250 trade unions and 
6 out of 15 federations in the state of São Paulo − including the largest in terms of number 
of workers, that is, the São Paulo textile and metal workers’ trade unions.
46 It seems, 
therefore, that in the late 1950s, as had happened in the 1940s, industrialists and 
governments also failed to create a representative wing of labor leaders which could 
successfully compete with the leftists and independents at the top of the major trade unions. 
  What happened to wages and productivity during the recovery of trade unions? As 
mentioned earlier, there were concerted attempts by Vargas and trabalhistas to forge a 
closer relationship with workers between 1951 and 1954. However, real industrial wages 
were unstable at the time, differently from what perhaps would be expected from a period 
dominated by a government highly interested in establishing a close link with the working 
classes. In Brazil’s manufacturing industry, an estimated wage increase of 7.8 per cent p.a. 
between 1950 and 1952 was followed by a drop of 7.0 per cent in 1953, and then by an 
increase of 11.8 per cent in 1954 (Table 1, column 1). The record of industrial wages in Sao 
Paulo was worse than in Brazil as a whole. Wages deteriorated between 1950 and 1953 
(with a fall of 1.6 per cent p.a.) and only in 1954 was there an appreciable improvement in 
average wage levels (10.2 per cent between 1953 and 1954) (Table 2, column 1). Another 
thrust in the struggle for real wage increases was to happen in the following years. Still, 
there were substantial yearly variations, especially in São Paulo. In Brazil’s manufacturing 
industry, industrial wages grew at a compound rate of 2.2 per cent p.a. during the 
Kubitscheck government − or 2.1 per cent p.a. if 1962 is taken as a more reliable reference 
year (Table 1, column 1). São Paulo’s industrial wages did worse. After an increase of 3.9 
per cent p.a. between 1955 and 1958, manufacturing wages fell by 9.9 per cent in 1959 and 
nearly stabilized in the following years. The compound rate of growth was only 0.52 per 
cent p.a. between 1955 and 1962 (Table 2, column 1). 
                                                 
43 E.g., J. Fishburn, Deterioration in Leadership and Anti-Communist Unity of the Three Older Labor Confederations, 
30/6/1960, RG 59, 832.062/6-3060, NACP. 
44 On the Movimento Renovador Sindical, see T. Harding, The Political History of Organized Labor in Brazil Stanford 
University, Ph.D. thesis, 1973, pp. 330-343. For the Catholic militants, see H. Martins, Igreja e Movimento Operário 
no ABC, São Paulo, Hucitec, 1994, chs. 1-2. On the PTB and João Goulart’s supporters, M.V. Benevides, O PTB e o 
Trabalhismo. Partido e Sindicato em São Paulo, 1945-1964, São Paulo, Brasiliense, 1989, chs. 5-6; and on Jânio 
Quadros’s supporters: J. Fishburn, Brazilian Labor 1959, 7/12/1959, RG 59, 832.06/12-759, NACP, pp. 6-7.  
45 W. Cochran, City of São Paulo Trade Union Convention, 18/4/1960, RG 59, 832.062/4-1860, NACP; J. Fishburn, Third 
National Labor Congress, 4/8/1960, RG 59, 832.062/8-460, NACP.  
46 B. Sowell, Briefing Paper on Labor in São Paulo, 27/10/1958, RG 59, 832.06/10-2758, NACP, p. 16.   17
  Labor productivity grew slowly in the early 1950s − 2.0 per cent p.a. in Brazil and 
2.8 per cent p.a. in São Paulo between 1950 and 1954. As a result, unit labor costs 
oscillated without a clear trend in the period: in Brazil, labor productivity surpassed wages 
in 1951 and 1953, but fell behind wage levels in 1952 and 1954; in São Paulo, labor 
productivity did better in 1953 but was below wage levels in 1951 and 1954 (Tables 1 and 
2, columns 2). Yet, in a clear departure from its earlier performance, labor productivity 
exhibited a strong upward trend in the 1955-1962 period. Tables 1 and 2 indicate that labor 
productivity in Brazil’s manufacturing industry rose 7.4 per cent p.a. between 1954 and 
1962, whereas in São Paulo the increase was of 6.9 per cent p.a. in the same period 
(columns 2). Consequently, unit labor costs (columns 4) experimented a noticeable decline 
between 1954 and 1962: from 1.00 to 0.72 (Brazil) and from 1.03 to 0.67 (São Paulo). This 
was an unprecedented outcome during the post-war years and suggests that organized labor 
was not able to avoid a decreasing share in the output per head, precisely when labor 
productivity soared in Brazilian and Paulista manufacturing industry. 
  The basis for a corporatist accommodation between labor and management, which 
could turn the upsurge in productivity in an equivalent increase in real wages and welfare, 
seemed precarious during the 1950s and early 1960s. Industrialists, on the one hand, and 
the most influential sections of the trade union movement on the other, advocated very 
different views on the position the working class should occupy in Brazilian society at the 
time. As a consequence, wage setting remained a source of continuous clashes and disputes 
between industrialists and the trade union movement. In the same way, the political divide 
prevented labor organizations from participating directly or indirectly in the formulation of 
economic and social policy. Particularly during the second half of the 1950s, the trade 
union movement was increasingly looking at the general economic issues as their direct 
concern, so that there was a potential base for collaboration and advancing labor demands 
as well as wider social reforms. Nonetheless, industrialists showed little disposition to 
negotiate wages and other issues called for by organized labor in São Paulo and Brazil at 
the time. For example, Paulista industrialists systematically rebuked all attempts to improve 
social legislation during the 1950s, including working week, maternity leave, compensation 
for accidents and restrictions to night work.
47 The crucial issue for Brazilian industrialists 
seems to have been that they were still highly suspicious of the leadership of the major 
trade unions and inter-union organization. An attempt to change this situation was made by 
the powerful international trade union organizations from the mid-1950s. The outcome will 
be seen in the following section. 
Trade unions and the Cold War: the ICFTU in Brazil 
  The conflicts among diverging orientations in the trade union movement were 
amplified by the Cold War. In particular, international labor politics started to play a part in 
disputes and conflicts within the trade union movement in Brazil during the second half of 
the 1950s. The ICFTU’s inter-American section, Organización Regional Interamericana de 
Trabajadores (or ORIT), had been set up in January 1951 at a conference in Mexico to co-
ordinate the anti-communist trade unions in the Western Hemisphere. A few years later, in 
April 1953, an ICF/ORIT office was established in Rio de Janeiro with the express aim of 
fighting the left-wing influence in Brazil’s trade unions. The office was located at the CNTI 
headquarters and employed one full-time trade unionist, who was in charge of propaganda 
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and contacts between the ICFTU/ORIT and Brazilian labor unions. A Consultative Council 
was initially composed by organizations which had been in liaison with ICFTU since its 
foundation in 1949 − the national confederations of industrial (CNTI) and commercial 
workers (CNTC) plus five federations.
48  
  Despite its ambitious beginnings, the ICFTU/ORIT office in Brazil was beset with 
quarrels and internal disputes, so that it was ineffective throughout the rest of the 1950s. 
The major obstacle to the operation of the office seems to have been the cautious support 
provided by the small number of organizations which made up the Consultative Council. 
For instance, the long-standing president of CNTI, Deocleciano Cavalcanti, on various 
occasions showed his reticence in following the strict anti-communist line prescribed by the 
ICFTU/ORIT, and even in being publicly associated with these international 
organizations.
49 As a high-level observer noted in 1957, ‘with the exception of Pequeno 
[president of the National Federation of Urban Workers] and his friends, the others 
seem[ed] to be afraid of showing too much sympathy with ORIT and the ICFTU’.
50  
  The cautious approach to the ICFTU/ORIT, taken by leading ministerialistas, seems 
to be directly related to the great influence of the left and independents in the post-war trade 
union movement in Brazil. In the highly competitive and radicalized contest for the key 
positions in the Brazilian labor movement during the 1950s, the link with an organization 
widely regarded as controlled by the US government and trade unions (as was indeed the 
case of ORIT) tended to represent a serious risk of eviction from labor politics. 
Furthermore, even the hard-line leadership of the national confederations and federations 
had to bargain with left-wing opposition in the day-to-day business of trade unions. This 
was what happened, for example, with the CNTI in the late 1950s, to the dismay of ICFTU 
representatives.
51 In such a political environment, therefore, the impact of the ICFTU/ORIT 
office could only be indirect and limited. If, on the one hand, the office helped to reinforce 
Cold War labor politics by providing an international link to the anti-communist forces 
operating in Brazil, on the other hand it could hardly be successful in establishing a solid 
anti-communist trade union block according to its original plans.  
  The low impact of ICFTU had important consequences for labor-management 
relations in the context of the highly polarized politics of the Cold War. Despite strenuous 
efforts, governments and industrialists in the past, and now the ICFTU, were not able to 
consolidate a cadre of ‘moderate’ labor leaders able to hold key positions in the larger trade 
unions and, in particular, among the rank and file and intermediate labor leaders. Likewise, 
there was no split in the labor movement which led to the isolation of the communists and 
leftists in general. It is true that the left and independents showed great eagerness to 
collaborate with the government in a programme which included fast industrial growth and 
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economic development. The majority of the labor leaders also lent support on various 
occasions to the protection of the national industry, price controls and anti-cyclical 
economic policies. However, in all these cases the leadership and the rank and file did not 
put aside the demand for better wages, workplace improvements and social rights. Instead, 
trade unions and the PUI advanced a view that economic development should incorporate 
and share its benefits with the working class, by means of increasing real wages and 
welfare. A leftist leadership and a trade union movement that pursued economic gains, 
welfare and social reforms were hardly the sort of partners longed for by industrialists at 
the time. A confrontational pattern of labor relations, which had emerged in the 1940s, 
seems to have been established as a feature of Brazil’s political economy during the 1950s 
and the early 1960s. 
Conclusions 
  
The tensions and conflicts generated by the industrialization process in Brazil were 
directly reflected in the sensitive area of labor relations during the post World War II 
period. Notwithstanding the highly centralized system of industrial relations inherited from 
the  Estado Novo, state intervention failed to inhibit the organization and political 
expression of an increasingly numerous and diversified working class. The result was the 
taking over of a large section of official trade unions by left-wing and independent groups 
and the proliferation of organizations parallel to the official corporatist structure after 1945. 
Compared to other historical experiences, even the powerful anti-communist forces 
organized world-wide by the ICFTU would not have a substantial influence on labor 
politics in Brazil during the 1950s. Instead of a corporatist accommodation between labor 
and managers that pursued economic growth and linked real wage increases to productivity, 
the gap between wages and productivity widened up and reduced the share of workers’ 
wages in the output per head. Prospects of eliciting labor co-operation at firm-level and in 
the society at large under such circumstances could be hardly achieved. 
  Two questions remain. Firstly, why were left-wing groups so prominent in Brazilian 
trade unions? The reason partly seems to lie in the repressive stance taken by both 
governments and employers in the immediate post-war years. Repression alienated even 
moderate labor leaders and made workers in general very distrustful of the cadre of official 
trade unionists cultivated by governments and industrialists. The left and independents 
rapidly filled the gap and consolidated their positions in the labor movement, despite the 
hostile political environment. The communists in particular were able to establish a 
relatively solid foundation among the most militant sections of labor leaders and the rank 
and file. When the political situation changed, left-wing groups and independents occupied 
the main positions in the official trade union structure (and set up parallel organizations), 
soon becoming the most active and reliable representatives of organized labor in São Paulo 
and Brazil.  
  Secondly, why did industrialists tend to be so reticent about negotiating wages and 
welfare with organized workers? It seems that the uncompromising stance taken by 
industrialists was greatly reinforced by the Dutra government’s full commitment to Cold 
War politics. The brief political liberalization between 1945 and early 1947 was marked by 
industrial leaders calling for order and containment of the wave of industrial actions. The 
opportunity to curb the re-emerging labor movement came with the Truman Doctrine of 
early 1947. Industrialists gave their full support to the wave of repression in trade unions   20
and played their part at firm-level by firing workers and tightening factory discipline. 
Therefore, rather than accepting a new role for the working class in Brazilian political 
economy, and supporting open politics and negotiating economic benefits and social rights, 
the industrialists backed an adjustment to the new post-war juncture which relied upon 
repression and large-scale intervention in labor issues. 
  A possible reason for such development goes beyond a deeply-ingrained bent for 
authoritarianism by Brazilian industrialists. As shown before, productivity growth was 
possibly slow in the early post-war years and this may help explain the hard-line stance by 
industrialists. Moreover, long-standing industrial practices, based on low wages, poor 
conditions, and limited training of the labor force, tended to undermine the search for 
incremental improvements in industrial products, processes and organizational structures 
which could lead to steady increases in productivity. Thus, industrial companies in São 
Paulo and Brazil may have seen the containment of workers' demand for better wages, 
conditions and welfare as a way to fight a situation which threatened their own survival as 
economic entities. Yet, if such a hypothesis seems plausible for the early post-war years, 
the same is not true for the second half of the 1950s, when productivity soared in the 
manufacturing industry. In the latter period, the reasons for the industrialists’ reticence for 
negotiating wages and welfare with organized labor seem to be mostly related to the 
particular developments in the trade union movement, as the left and independents took 
over the major trade unions in Brazil and were not considered reliable partners by 
employers. 
  The anti-communist policy promoted world-wide by the US government found in 
Brazilian elites and governments it’s most dedicated supporters − to the extent that the 
largest country in Latin America soon became a safe area in terms of communist threat. In 
particular, the Dutra government’s attempts to evict the communists from public life 
showed that the US government could direct its energies to other regions less successful in 
their struggle against left-wingers. This situation helped to produce an unexpected outcome, 
at least for local elites − the exclusion of Brazil (and Latin America) from the major inflows 
of US capital during the 1940s and 1950s. Another consequence − though less recognized 
today − was that independents and left-wingers established a firm foothold in Brazil’s trade 
union movement. Only at the end of the 1950s did the US government become aware of the 
ground it had lost to the left-wing forces in Brazilian trade unions and of the dangerous 
situation created for its strategic interests in Latin America. 
  Compared to the post-war history of Western European countries and Japan, the 
different outcomes of labor politics in Brazil could not be more striking. Whereas in Europe 
and Japan, non-communist trade union leaders paved the way for a social democratic 
contract for growth, in Brazil the agenda for social reform was headed by the communists 
and other left-wing groups. Whereas in Europe and Japan management counted on 
‘moderate’ labor leaders for a productivity drive in exchange for economic and social 
benefits, in post-war Brazil, employers held an anti-labor policy − both on the shop floor 
and in society at large − eschewing compromise with demands for real wage increases and 
welfare by the leftist labor militancy. The divided world of the Cold War made even more 
difficult any settlement conducive to a compact for growth in Brazil, which had the difficult 
task of bringing together management and communist labor leaders.  
  The irony is that where the US anti-communist foreign policy found its most willing 
followers, even disposed to evict left-wingers from trade unions by force, as in post-war   21
Brazil, a social basis for sustained growth and social reform turned out to be more and more 
unlikely. In Europe, in turn, US policy-makers had to deal with consolidated social 
democratic groups in order to prevent the hegemony of the pro-Soviet trade union 
militancy. The adoption of a crude anti-communist policy gave way to bargaining large-
scale resources and assistance epitomized by the Marshall Plan. Meanwhile, in Brazil and 
Latin America, eager cold-warriors sought to implement by all means available the anti-
communist line hinted at by the Truman Doctrine. Does this mean that the social compact 
for growth could only become a historical reality because of the limits posed to the US anti-
communist thrust in Europe and Japan?  
  In any case, for Brazil the effects of post-war labor politics were clear. Even when 
conditions were favorable for economic growth and democracy, relations between 
industrialists and labor remained essentially hostile and antagonistic during most of the 
1950s and early 1960s. Results were felt a few years later, when the acute political and 
social conflicts reached their climax with the military coup which for a long time radically 
altered the prospects for democracy and social reform in Brazil.   22
Appendix 
Sources 
Yearly data for Tables 1 and 2 were obtained as follows: 
1) Wages: 
1945-1948 - Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões dos Industriários (IAPI), Brazil and state 
of São Paulo: IBGE, Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, 1941 to 1945, 1947, 1948, 1951. 
Figures refer to wages paid in July. 
1950 (São Paulo), 1952-1958: Registro Industrial, Brazil: IBGE, Anuário Estatístico do 
Brasil, 1952, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1959, 1960, 1965. Registro Industrial, state of São Paulo: 
Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, 1952; IBGE, Produção Industrial de São Paulo, 1952, 1953, 
1954, 1955; IBGE, Produção Industrial Brasileira, 1956, 1957, 1958. Mean wages of 
monthly average production workers. 
1949 e 1959: Censo Industrial, Brazil and state of São Paulo: IBGE, Anuário Estatístico do 
Brasil, 1955, 1963. Mean wages of monthly average production workers. 
1950 (Brazil), 1951, 1960, 1961: estimated by interpolation using the formula of annual 
compound rate of growth. 
Nominal average wages were converted to cruzeiros at 1952 rate by using the following 
price indexes: Table 1 - Brazil: the consumer price index of the Ministry of Labor between 
1948 and 1962; for 1945-47, national wages were deflated by the consumer price index of 
São Paulo Prefecture. Table 2 - São Paulo: the consumer price index of São Paulo 
Prefecture. Source: IBGE, Estatísticas Históricas do Brasil, 2nd ed., Rio de Janeiro, IBGE, 
1990. 
2) Labor productivity: 
1950 (São Paulo), 1952-1958, 1949 e 1959: number of workers, same sources as 1) above. 
Labor productivity indexes were obtained by dividing the valor da transformação 
industrial (a measure similar to the industrial value added: see IBGE, Estatísticas 
Históricas do Brasil, p. 370) by the monthly average number of production workers. 
1950 (Brazil), 1951, 1960, 1961: estimated by interpolation using the formula of annual 
compound rate of growth. 
1945-1948: number of workers, same sources as 1) above. Given the lack of data similar to 
industrial value added for such years, estimated measures were obtained by backward 
extrapolation  of the annual compound rate of growth of the valor da transformação 
industrial between 1949-1952 (Brazil) and 1949-1951 (São Paulo) − see the formula below. 
The annual compound rates of growth obtained were 2.6 per cent (Brazil) and 1.0 per cent 
(São Paulo). The years 1949-1952 (Brazil) and 1949-1951 (São Paulo) were chosen as the 
basis for extrapolation because of their relative stability before the structural break 
identified in Brazil’s and São Paulo’s valor de transformação industrial series (1952 and 
1953, respectively) by a dummy variable test for structural stability identical to that 
presented below for the labor productivity series. 
Nominal valor da transformação industrial was converted to cruzeiros at 1952 rate by 
using the Índice Geral de Preços - Disponibilidade Interna, produced by Fundação Getúlio 
Vargas. Source: IBGE, Estatísticas Históricas do Brasil. 
 
Calculating the annual compound rate of growth   23
The annual compound rate of growth ( ) i is implicitly defined by 











   Xt = value  of X  at time t 
Given  X0 and  Xt from the previous formula, the annual compound rate of growth between 






















11 0 0 
Testing structural stability in labor productivity series  
The following model was estimated for both Brazil and São Paulo: 
   w
p            (1) 
where 
  ln LP = the natural logarithm of labor productivity LP 
  Di = 0 for observations before 1955 (Brazil) and 1956 (São Paulo) 
                = 1 for observations from 1955 (Brazil) and 1956 (São Paulo) 
   Xi = time 
  µi = error term 
Regressions for the subperiods are: 
   () EL P D X X ii i ln , == + 0 11 αβ          ( 2 )  
and 
   () ( ) ( ) EL P D X X ii i ln , == + + + 1 12 12 αα ββ          ( 3 )  
The results based on the models (1), (2) and (3) are as follows: 
Brazil 
  lnLP 8.29 0.26D 0.04X 0.03D X iii i = − + +  
    t        = (293.623)(−2.642) (8.081) (3.409) 
   R
2 =   0.981 
  F = 238.160 
Model for subperiod 1945-1954 () Di = 0  
  ln . . LP Xi = + 829 004  
Model for subperiod 1955-1962 () Di = 1  






= − + +
=+




  ln . . . . LP D X D X iii i = − + + 859 028 002 009  
    t         = (317.701)(-2.279) (5.717) (3.831) 
   R
2 = 0.97 
  F = 181.977   24
model for subperiod 1945-1955() Di = 0 
  ln . . LP Xi = − 859 002  
model for subperiod 1956-1962 () Di = 1 
   () ( ) ln . . . . LP Xi = − + + 859 028 002 003  
                       = + 831 005 .. Xi 
As the differential intercept and the differential slope coefficients (α 2 and β 2, 
respectively) are statiscally significant (as indicated by t statistics) in both Brazil and São 
Paulo´s basic models, there is strong evidence that labor productivity series are not 
continuous through time, ie, that there is a structural break in the series. The models for 
subperiods show the different intercept and slope coefficients for each subperiod in which 
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